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Abstract 
The 1997 Watercourses Convention is the first and the only worldwide instrument 
enacted under the auspice of the United Nations as far as the non-navigational uses 
of international watercourses is concerned. Although the Convention has entered in 
to force in 2014 after seventeen years of its adoption, many watercourse states are 
still hesitant to join the Convention. Given the divergent views of the respective 
countries towards the provisions of the Convention coupled with the existing tension 
and lack of genuine trust among downstream vis-à-vis upstream blocks, none of the 
Nile riparian states are currently parties to the Convention. The article is thus aimed 
to examine whether joining to or staying out from the Convention provides a better-
off position for Ethiopia particularly in its relation with the two downstream 
Countries-Egypt and Sudan. Owing to the confusing and downstream favored 
provisions of the Convention coupled with the Egyptians’ long lasting adherence to 
historic right based argument, the article asserted that the move to join the 
Convention might be expensive for Ethiopia which may force it to pay unnecessary 
bills for the advantages of the two downstream countries. Therefore, I argue that it is 
better for Ethiopia to stay out from the Convention and the complexities thereto while 
expecting at least ‘a half and a loaf’ from the application of the customary 
international water law regime, if there is any. 
Keywords: equitable use, framework convention, Nile basin, riparian, significant harm, 
watercourses 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses [hereinafter the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWCC) or the 
Convention] entered into force on 17 August 2014, following a long and complex journey.1 
The delay of the Convention’s entry in to force and the reluctance of many countries to join it 
indicate the existence of divergent views among riparian countries towards the benefits they 
can derive out of it.2 As a result, countries decided their better-off position by calculating cost-
benefits of being party to the Convention or staying out of it. In this regard, the Nile riparian 
states including Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan are not parties to the Convention.3 
This article examines whether joining to or staying out from the UN Watercourses 
Convention is a better off position for Ethiopia in the context of Nile. To this effect, the article 
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examines the pros and cons of applying the Convention in the Nile River basin and its 
possible impacts on Ethiopia’s interest. Whether the Convention favors the upstream Ethiopia 
or the downstream- Egypt and Sudan would be assessed depending up on the content and 
limitations of the Convention coupled with the legal framework of the Nile, the positions of 
riparian states, and the level of cooperation among Nile riparians. 
The first section describes the lengthy and turbulent road to the UN Watercourses 
Convention. It particularly, presents the voting patterns made for the adoption of the 
Convention by the Working Group (commonly referred the UNGA’s Sixth or Legal 
Committee) and then by the General Assembly with a view to examine how far the positions 
of riparian states were shaped by their geographical stand in the respective river basins as 
upstream, downstream or midstream states. It also briefly examines whether the Convention 
indeed entered into force under the acceptance of “watercourses states” for real by taking into 
consideration the existence of states that have ratified the Convention while having no 
apparent interest in the utilization of the “international watercourses” as covered in the 
meaning of the Convention. Section two presents the nature and scope of the Convention and 
the implication thereof with respect to its enforcement and acceptability. Section three 
presents the main controversial provisions of the Convention and the views of upstream and 
downstream riparian thereto as a background for the subsequent discussions. Section four 
examines whether the Convention really matters in the Nile River basin in general considering 
the divergent views of the riparian states towards the utilization of the Nile water. Section five 
analyzes the Convention’s provisions in the Ethiopian context and answers the question 
‘whether we are better off as a non- party state or not’. Section six briefly presents the 
advantages and beneficial application of the Convention. Finally, the paper offers a 
concluding remark. 
II. THE TURBULENT ROAD TOWARDS UNWCC AND BEYOND: ISSUES TO BE RAISED 
The problems of the sharing, management and protection of international rivers did not 
bear the attention of the international community before the late 1950s mainly due to the fact 
that disputes over shared resources were rare.4 It had also been asserted that there were no 
international customary rules that could be perceived in this area of law.5 However, with the 
emergence of “new disputes in certain basins”6, the issue of examining the question of the 
non-navigational uses of international watercourses became the exclusive realm of non-
governmental efforts or States until late 1950’s when the United Nations decided to examine 
the issue and referred the matter to the International Law Commission (ILC) in 1970 with the 
task of studying the law on the subject for codification and progressive development.7 
Earlier than ILC, with a view to find acceptable rules of international law and solve the 
divergent views held by the upper and downstream states thereto, the two scholarly Non-
Governmental Organizations namely the Institute of International Law (IIL) and the 
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International Law Association (ILA) had begun working on the law governing the utilization 
of international freshwater resource and adopted different resolutions and declarations.8 
However, the declarations and rules adopted by the two institutions are not all the same 
especially as to core principles to be used in determining the utilization of watercourses. As 
revealed in Madrid Declaration (1911) and Salzburg Resolution (1961), the  works of the IIL 
emphasized on the obligation not to cause significant harm to other riparians even if the 
absolute prohibition of harm in the former declaration has been relaxed to some extent in the 
later resolution.9 On the other hand, unlike the IIL resolutions, the ILA rules emphasized on 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of shared watercourses as revealed in 
Dubrovnik statement (1956), the New York Resolution (1958) and largely in Helsinki Rules 
(1966).10 Compared with others, the Helsinki rules were said to be the most comprehensive 
and widely referred rules until the adoption of the UN Watercourses Convention.11 
Although such rules and resolutions were not binding per se, they generally influenced 
the ILC where it started its work in 1971. As the 1997 UN Watercourse Convention reflected 
the most important customary norms, it based largely on the ILA’s work, particularly the 
Helsinki Rules, and to some extent on the work of the IIL.12 In this regard, the Convention 
itself recognizes “the valuable contribution of international organizations, both governmental 
and non-governmental, to the codification and progressive development of international law in 
this field”.13 
However, it is important to note that the preparatory work of the UN Watercourses 
Convention by the ILC took more than two decades. The ILC adopted the final draft articles in 
1994.14 The draft articles were then considered by the UNGA’s Sixth (Legal) Committee in 
1996 and 1997, and finally adopted by the Assembly on May 21, 1997 by a vote of 103-3-27 
(103 in favor, 3 against and 27 abstentions) with 33 States being absent.15 Despite the fact that 
more than 100 states voted for the Convention in 1997, it entered into force after 17 years of 
its adoption on 17 August 2014, 90 days after the deposit of the 35th instrument of ratification 
by Vietnam.16 This lengthy road to the Convention and its delay to enter in to force reveals the 
complexity of issues and the divergent views of riparian states towards its main provisions. 
At this juncture it is important to observe the voting patterns made at the adoption of the 
final draft of the Convention in the Working Group and the adoption of the same by the 
General assembly in 1997. Although the Convention has been adopted by an overwhelming 
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majority of states due to the concessionary or compromising languages of its provisions, the 
negotiation process was largely turbulent and full of contentions. For example, the meaning 
and the relations between the equitable and reasonable utilization principle and the no harm 
rule, the status of existing agreements, the dispute settlement and notification provisions were 
among the most contentious provisions of the Convention throughout the negotiation process 
where a range of alternatives were proposed by different states.17 However, during 
negotiations the positions of the national delegations were largely shaped by their perceptions 
of their country’s geographic circumstances as upstream, downstream or ‘midstream’ 
(upstream and downstream with respect to different watercourses) states.18 
According to the Working Group’s rules of procedures, the Group first had to adopt the 
draft articles on an article-by-article basis. While doing this, most of the articles were adopted 
with little discussions and without a vote. However, a recorded vote was requested regarding 
the articles 3, 5-7, and 33 plus annex.19 For the purpose of this article let us see only the voting 
patterns made with respect to Art 3, and Art 5-7.  
Art 3 (Watercourses Agreements) was adopted by 36 states for, 3 against (Egypt, France 
and Turkey) and 21 abstaining. Here surprisingly Egypt, the strong advocate of the survival of 
existing watercourse agreements, voted against Art 3 while Ethiopia has abstained.20 With 
respect to the package on Art 5 to 7, it was adopted by 38 states in favor, 4 against (China, 
France, Tanzania and Turkey), and 22 abstaining. Ethiopia and Egypt were among those 
countries that were abstained.21 But amongst the states that voted in favor of the adoption of 
the package, the majority of them were downstream and midstream states showing that the 
instant provisions are either in favor of them or confusing in the manner that supports their 
position.22 Moreover, given the significant numbers of abstentions coupled with the votes 
against, the votes made in favor for the adoption of the above two items of provisions was a 
modest score; which in turn shows the extents of the discard among states on these delicate 
issues.  
Eventually, the final text of the Convention was adopted by the Working Group of the 
whole by a vote of 42 states for, 3 against and 18 abstentions while 130 states were absent. 
Amongst the Nile riparian States who participated in the voting, Ethiopia and Sudan voted in 
favor, while Egypt, Rwanda and Tanzania abstained.23 From the above voting pattern one can 
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understand that Egypt had insisted in its position where it either voted against or abstained, 
while Ethiopia had voted in favor to the final draft of the Convention in the Working Group. 
Finally, after two decades of turbulent journey, the UN Watercourses Convention was adopted 
by the General Assembly on May 21, 1997 under the overwhelming majority of states. And, 
as mentioned above, the vote was 103 in favor, 3 against (Burundi24, China and Turkey), 27 
abstained25 while 33 were absent.26 Given the difficult, protracted and controversial history of 
its drafting, securing the support of such a solid majority of the UN Members, including a 
significant number of States sharing important international watercourses, was surprising.27 
Nevertheless, it is important to examine the voting patterns with respect to upstream 
states vis-à-vis downstream or midstream states to understand which block voted largely in 
favor or against the adoption of the Convention, or abstained. Because this, to some extent, 
implies to whom the Convention favors at least in the perceptions of the then countries’ 
representatives. Although the fact of securing large support from the side of the majority of 
downstream countries does not necessarily mean that the Convention is downstream favored, 
such fact would still have significance in determining whether the Convention is the one that 
ought to be ratified by upstream countries like Ethiopia particularly if the voting patterns 
made during the adoption of the Convention in 1997 and the subsequent ratifications for the 
entry into force of the same in 2014 coincided. Because this at least shows the ‘comfort zone’ 
nature of the Convention for the downstream and midstream states compared to the upstream 
once as revealed by their relative voting positions and the move to ratify the Convention then 
after. In addition, based on the circumstances of the case, other factors like the power balance, 
the level of trust and brotherhood among upstream and downstream states, the water 
abundance or scarcity in the basin as well as which block has already developed 
infrastructures on the water in question (the issue of existing uses) may influence the position 
that a given riparian state may take towards the Convention. 
For example, upstream state having a hegemonic status and significant existing uses in 
the basin may opt to join the Convention even if in the normal course of things, the provisions 
of the Convention are said to be downstream favored. Similarly, if staying out would bring no 
change in the status quo, the weak upstream state with no substantial existing uses may still 
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314 (Salman & Boissonde Chaournes eds., 1999).  
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considerations than to hydro-geographic reality”. See Stephen McCaffrey & Mpazi Sinjela, The 1997 United 
Nations Convention on International Watercourses, 92(1) THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94, 
105 (1998). 
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Ethiopia, France, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Israel, Mali, Mongolia, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Rwanda, 
Spain, Tanzania, Uzbekistan.  
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Tajikistan, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Zaire, Zimbabwe. 
27 WOUTERS, supra note 23.  
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opt to vote in favor of the Convention just with a view to benefit from the little chance that the 
Convention accords to it, to use the same as a ‘diplomatic instrument’ of getting the heart of 
and financial support from the outside world, and thereby indirectly make the long-lasting 
prohibitive acts of the downstream hegemony to be condemned by the international 
community. 
On the other hand, a downstream state having substantial existing uses with a hegemonic 
status in the basin may still opt not to join the Convention with a view to make the ‘status quo’ 
unaltered even in a slight degree although the Convention is still said to be downstream 
favored. In this regard, we can take for example the vote made against Art 3 (existing 
agreements) of the Convention by Egypt despite the fact that the provision is really in its 
favor; since it does not abolish the validity of ‘existing agreements’ where Egypt can benefit 
out of them. As will be discussed latter, Egypt’s vote against Art 3 in particular and its 
abstention to the Convention and the subsequent hesitation to ratify the same in general does 
not mean that the Convention is not downstream favored. Rather, the positions of some 
downstream countries like Egypt is emanated from the overwhelming desire to have more and 
to make the status quo untouched. The saying of Gandhi can better express such kind of 
positions- “[T]here is enough for everyone’s need. There is never enough for everyone’s 
greed”.28 
Therefore, as one can understand from the aforementioned discussions the riparian states’ 
placement in the basin may not be a sole determinant factor to hold the position for or against 
the Convention. Even there may be a situation where a country’s position may owe more to 
political consideration than hydro-geographic reality. However, such instances are exceptional 
cases which may not undermine the value of using the strong nexus between the geographical 
position of states and their respective voting positions as a basis to determine or at least 
predict to which block the Convention seems favored.  
In this regard, the overall observation of the voting pattern reveals that the Convention 
was supported mainly by downstream and midstream states while many upstream states were 
either voted against or abstained. For instance, all of the three States (Burundi, Turkey and 
China) that voted against the Convention are upper riparian for the Nile, Tigris-Euphrates, and 
Mekong Rivers respectively. Moreover, amongst the 27 states that abstained during the 
adoption of the Convention, a significant numbers of countries were upper riparian.29 On the 
other hand, many of the major states which were the core of the downstream and midstream 
blocks voted in favor of the Convention.30 These all shows how the downstream and 
midstream states had largely perceived that the Convention is in favor of them which seem 
right as the subsequent discussions reveals. 
When coming to the Nile Basin, the above geographical position-based argument seems 
weak. Amongst the Nile riparian states, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tanzania and Rwanda abstained; 
Eritrea, Uganda, Zaire (DRC) were absent; Sudan and Kenya voted in favor while Burundi 
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RESPONSES 121, 122 (Edward H.P. Brans et al, Eds., 1997). 
29 For example, Ethiopia, France, India, Spain, Rwanda and Tanzania. 
30 For example, Netherland, Portugal, Hungary, Syria, Bangladesh, Mexico and Greece from downstream 
block; and Finland, Canada, USA, Germany, South Africa, and Brazil from midstream block.  
2015]                         UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION FROM ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT                             7 
 
 
voted against.31 Here the vote by Kenya in favor of the Convention as an upstream state and 
the abstention by Egypt as a downstream state during the adoption of the Convention may cast 
doubt on the above assertion that the main provisions are downstream favored. However, as 
argued above, the abstention of Egypt for example seems largely emanated from its strong 
desire to make the status quo untouched based on the long lasting “the drop of water 
argument”, rather than not believing in the fact that the main provisions of the Convention are 
at least on average downstream favored. In this regard, the consistent vote in favor of the 
adoption of the Convention by Sudan during the Working Group as well as during the final 
adoption by the General Assembly in 1997 partly shows that the Sudanese initially perceived 
the Convention as favoring downstream. Particularly, as a midstream country, the then 
Sudan’s position seems to take advantages of its position both as upstream state for Egypt and 
downstream state for others and thereby secure advantages of both sides that the Convention 
may confer while taking in mind its dominant water utilization in the basin at a distant second 
in one hand and the hegemonic status of the most downstream State-Egypt in the other hand.  
Regarding the then position of Kenya, it may be derived by its relative position as 
downstream state for the upper White Nile basin. Or the state’s hydro-geography in the upper 
Nile basin will prevent their activities from affecting Egypt or Sudan since it is the Blue Nile 
that contributes much for the Nile water to which Kenya has no concern. Despite its support in 
1997, however, Kenya has reserved from ratifying the Convention and currently none of the 
Nile riparian states are parties to the Convention. 
Nevertheless, the non-party status of the Nile riparian states to the Convention still shows 
the little acceptance of the Convention in the eyes of the Nile basin. Moreover, one can point 
out that in all major basins with conflicts, where such a Convention is expected to be applied 
on, at least one country voted against the Convention, abstained or were absent.32 This shows 
how the major watercourses sates were in ambivalence particularly as to the contribution of 
the Convention to the resolution of disputes over the use of such international rivers like the 
Danube, Ganges, Jordan, Nile, Mekong or the Euphrates.33 
Having said these on the adoption of the Convention and the voting patterns thereof, a 
question may arise on the issue of its ratification. As mentioned earlier, despite the adoption of 
the Convention by a solid majority numbers of states in 1997, it took seventeen years to enter 
into force showing that those who voted for its adoption did not show the same interest for its 
entry into force.34 However, as we can understand from the lists of the countries that have 
ratified the Convention vis-à-vis their position in 1997;35 the majority of them are still 
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32  Schroeder, supra note 19, at 22   
33 Aaron.T. Wolf, Conflict and cooperation along international waterways, 1 WATER POLICY 249, 252 
(1998); Ellen Hey, The Watercourses Convention: To what extent does it provide a basis for regulating uses of 
international watercourses? 7(3) REVIEWS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 290, 297-300 (1998). 
34 Amongst more than 100 states that had voted in favor of the Convention, only about 25 states ratified the 
Convention, and almost all of them are downstream or midstream countries. 
35 Parties to the Convention includes Finland, Norway, Hungary, Sweden, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Germany, Spain, Greece, France, Denmark, Luxemburg, Italy, Monte Negro, the UK, Ireland , South Africa, 
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remaining consistent with their previous position which is particularly true for downstream 
and midstream states. Thus, from the distribution of states that have ratified the Convention, 
one can point out that the majority of them are either downstream or midstream states showing 
again the Convention’s provisions are comfortable with them compared to the upstream states.  
However, it should be noted that all of the current parties to the Convention are not those 
who had given their support to its adoption in 1997. Certain countries that were absent or 
abstained in 1997 have also ratified the Convention.36 This is may be either due to the change 
in their previous stand and understandings towards the provisions of the Convention or the 
change in their knowledge as to the nature of the ‘watercourses’ they shared with other 
countries or on some other motive.37 
Similarly, the same reason of changes in countries’ perceptions after 1997 justifies for the 
countries’ failure, who had previously supported for its adoption, to go for ratification. For 
instance, in the Working Group both upstream and downstream states had voted for the 
compromising language of Art 7 of the Convention, because both camps had developed their 
own but different versions of understanding. At this juncture, Lucius Caflish for example 
noted: 
The new formula [regarding the relationships of the two principles as reflected by 
the language of Art 7(2)] was considered by a number of lower riparians to be 
sufficiently neutral not to suggest a subordination of the no-harm rule to the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization. A number of upper riparians 
thought just the contrary, namely that, that formula was strong enough to support the 
idea of such subordination.38 
However, these positive but different perceptions that had been developed by the two blocks 
during the adoption of the Convention in 1997 did not continue then after. Instead, second 
thoughts about the relationship between the two principles started surfacing in the minds of 
many states which latter contributed for the delays of the entry into force of the Convention.39 
This shows how the compromising languages of the Convention (as the case for the 
relationships between the two principles) has paved the way for divergent lines of arguments 
where only the powerful would often benefit out of this uncertainty. Such kind of uncertainty 
and absence of clarity on the main principles of the Convention would erode the confidence of 
weak riparian states (particularly those found in basins characterized by asymmetric power 
relation and water utilization patterns like Nile) to equally compete and enforce their interests 
compared to the basin’s hegemony acting with its full material, ideational and bargaining 
powers. As will be discussed later, the large opportunity of the hegemonies (Egypt and Sudan 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
Namibia, Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq , Qatar, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.  
36 For example, Spain, France, Uzbekistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Niger, Libya and Benin.  
37 For example, Libya was among the countries that had abstained in 1997 on the issue of groundwater; 
objecting the exclusionary rule of the Convention with respect to the ‘confined groundwater or aquifer’. 
However, it joined the Convention latter. While explaining its reason for joining the Convention, Salman stated 
the changing of its perception regarding the nature of the ground water (i.e. the Nubian aquifer) it shared with 
other countries (e.g. Egypt) as a reason for its latter ratification. He further explained: “…Libya perceived the 
Nubian aquifer as a connected groundwater and joined the Convention, because she wants to be part of the 
Nile…’ See Salman M.A. Salman (2015): Lecture given at University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, 22 May 2015, on 
the title ‘Entry into force of the UN Watercourses Convention: Why should it matters?” Available at Online 
Seminar www.ooskanews.com. 
38 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 15. 
39 Salman, supra note 1, at 9.  
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in the Nile case) to benefit more from the compromising languages of the Convention coupled 
with many other downstream favored provisions of the same would make the move to join the 
Convention by countries like Ethiopia costly. 
Coming back to the issue of ratification, it is important to address a question as to 
whether the entry in to force of the Convention has been succeeded under the ratification acts 
of ‘interested’ parties who are ‘watercourse states’ for real. It should be noted that some of the 
current parties to the Convention have neither trans-boundary surface water nor non-confined 
groundwater that shared with other countries. In other words, they have no apparent interest in 
the allocation and utilization of trans-boundary water resources putting the validity and entry 
into force of the Convention under a question mark. We can take for instance, Great Britain, 
Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Qatar. Interestingly, Qatar and Libya have no surface water they 
share with other countries, and the ground water they share with other countries may not even 
be covered by the Convention since they are not connected with surface water.40 
So the reason why parties who are nothing to do with trans-boundary watercourses joined 
the Convention may be either with another intention other than sharing of waters or to show 
simply their support to the idea and thereby contribute for the Convention’s entry in to force. 
Owing to this fact, the writer believes that had it not been ratified by such parties who are 
nothing to do with international watercourses, the Convention would have not entered in to 
force or at least took more years.  
Thus, the coming in to force of the Convention per se may not necessarily be considered 
as the reflections of watercourse states for real. The reluctant position of riparian states to sign 
and ratify or accede to the Convention reveals the riparian states’ divergent view to its 
provisions and the interpretation thereto.41 For instance, as mentioned above none of the Nile 
basin countries (of both upper riparian and lower riparian) are parties to the Convention with 
having different perceptions. Although some argued that such perceptions are inaccurate42, the 
compromising languages of the Convention which are deliberately made with intent to 
facilitate its adoption have contributed for the existing areas of contentions. Some of the 
contentious provisions of the Convention are discussed latter. 
III. SCOPE OF THE UNWCC: DO THEY HAVE ANY IMPLICATION ON THE ACCEPTABILITY 
OF THE CONVENTION? 
UNWCC is “a framework instrument which sets forth general substantive and procedural 
provisions to be applied by all Parties irrespective of their specific geographical location, or 
position vis-à-vis other watercourse States, or level of development.”43 Therefore, as a 
framework Convention it does not address the peculiar feature of every trans-boundary 
watercourses.44 Given the diverse characteristics of international watercourses and the 
interests thereto, the Convention only contains certain general rules that could serve as a basis 
                                                          
40 Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Latter: Why Has its Entry 
in to Force Proven Difficult? 32:1 INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES ASSOCIATION, WATER INTERNATIONAL 1, 
8 (2007). 
41 Salman, supra note 1, at 11. 
42 Id. 
43 WOUTERS, supra note 23, at 316.   
44 The framework nature of the Convention can be deduced from the provisions of the Convention itself. See 
The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Paragraph 5 of the Preamble and Art 3(3). 
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for negotiation, and leaves the details for the riparian states to complement in agreements by 
taking in to account the specific characteristics of the watercourse in question.45 By doing so 
the Convention encourages parties to follow the general principles of the Convention in their 
specific agreements while still allowing the departure.46 
Even if taking the ‘framework approach’ is widely described as a necessity for the 
watercourse Convention to reach in to consensus; it has also been criticized by many alleging 
that it provides little or no solution for basins with conflicts. Instead, it allows respective 
riparian states to engage in almost endless discussions over all the factors which might be 
considered.47 This is especially true in a basin lacking genuine cooperative framework like 
Nile.48 The Convention is adopted with the goal of ensuring the utilization, development, 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses, and the promotion of 
their optimal and sustainable utilization for present and future generation.49 To this effect, it 
incorporates different principles, but whose implementation primarily requires cooperation 
among riparian countries. That is why the Convention emphasized on the concept of 
cooperation; where it includes 15 references to the word and its derivatives.50 
However, as mentioned above, a question may arise as to how such a ‘framework 
Convention’; that only provides ‘general guidelines’ and whose implementation is heavily 
relied on the good will, cooperation and agreement of watercourse states; can indeed able to 
achieve its objectives. Accordingly, some scholars questioned the effect of the Watercourses 
Convention and its application to the resolution of disputes over the use of water in the river 
basins with conflict or susceptible to conflict where the relation among respective riparian 
states has been largely characterized by tension, lack of trust or genuine cooperation.51 
Based on the framework and non-obligatory natures of the Convention’s provisions, Hey 
for instance asserted that the Convention is designed in the manner that it neither furthers 
sustainable water use nor regulates the discretionary powers of watercourse states.52 She 
argued that although the furtherance of cooperation and the attainment of sustainable water 
use thereto are acknowledged as the main goals that should be pursued by watercourse states, 
the Convention does not impose the concomitant legally binding obligations on its Parties.53 
                                                          
45 Salman, supra note 1, at 8. 
46 Takele Soboka, Between Ambivalence and Necessity: Occlusions on the Path towards A Basin –Wide 
Treaty in the Nile Basin, 20(3) COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L & POL’Y 291, 293(2008-2009). 
47 Peter Beaumont, The 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-navigational uses of International 
Watercourses: Its Strengths and the Need for New Workable Guidelines, 16(4) WATER RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT 475, 487(2000).  
48 As revealed in the past platform of negotiations in the Nile basin viz. Hydromet (1967), Udungu (1983) and 
Tecco Nile (1992), the negotiations were focused on technical matters which intentionally excludes the main 
issue of water allocation except the negotiations made for the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) under 
the auspice of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). However, even the negotiations for the CFA failed to close the 
chapter of the colonial legacy and the downstream hegemony in the Nile basin due to the introduction of the non-
legal concept- ‘water security’- under Art 14 of the CFA by which the two downstream countries are aimed to 
protect their current uses and rights. See Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework, open for 
signature as of May 2010 (not yet entry into force), annex on Art 14(b) where Egypt and Sudan proposed a 
provision stipulating “not to adversely affect the water security and current uses and rights of any Nile basin 
state” (herein after CFA, 2010). 
49 The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, paragraph 5 of the preamble.    
50 Salman, supra note 1, at .8 
51 Schroeder, supra note 19, at 21.  
52 Hey, supra note 33, at 297-299. 
53 Id. at 291-293. 
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She further asserted that it does not require states to protect basic human needs, nor that they 
develop integrated water policies or “provide minimum standards that watercourse states are 
to further develop through cooperation among themselves”.54 Similarly, Wolf supported this 
view by stating that “it [the Convention] provides few practical guidelines for allocations, the 
heart of most water conflicts”.55 Therefore, according to Hey and Wolf, the Convention is 
simply the collection of customary international law where it only specifies the fact that a 
number of general environmental law obligations apply to international watercourses; without 
imposing new obligations other than those which are already binding upon watercourse states 
by virtue of customary international law.56 
However in the contrary, scholars like McCafrey and Tanzi supported the framework 
nature of the Convention and have the expectation that watercourse problems can be tackled 
in an integrated and coordinated manner through consultation and negotiation.57 Although the 
writer of this article believe on negotiation, leaving everything to be determined by 
negotiations of parties would lead to infinite dialogue particularly given the scarcity of fresh 
water resources in many basins coupled with the Convention’s wide room for parties’ 
departure and absence of clear guidelines for negotiation.  
Having said these with respect to the framework nature of the Convention, let us see the 
scope of the Convention. The scope of the Convention has been limited based on the types of 
uses of international watercourses (i.e. navigational and non-navigational uses) and the mode 
of their existence (i.e. surface water and ground water). Accordingly, the Convention’s 
application is limited to “the uses of international watercourses and of their waters for 
purposes other than navigation and to measures of protection, preservation and management 
related to the uses of those watercourses and their waters”.58 However, the exclusion of the 
navigational uses of international watercourses is not absolute59 as the Convention applies to 
navigation in so far as other uses affect or is affected by navigation.60 
Moreover, ‘confined ground water’- a ground water which is not connected with surface 
water flowing to a common terminus- are excluded from the ambit of the Convention as 
revealed in the definition of ‘watercourse’. The Convention defines the term ‘watercourse’ to 
include both ‘surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical 
relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus’.61 And it is 
international if parts of the watercourses are situated in different States.62 It is clear from these 
definitions that certain, but not all ground waters fall within the scope of the Convention. The 
definition includes only groundwater which is hydrologically related to surface water. It does 
                                                          
54 Id. at 291. 
55 Wolf, supra note 33. 
56 Hey, supra note 33, at 292. 
57 STEPHAN C. MCCAFFREY, Water scarcity: Institutional and legal responses, in THE SCARCITY OF WATER: 
EMERGING LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES 52, 56 (Brans, Edward H.P. et al. eds, 1997), London, The Hague, 
Boston; and Attila Tanzi, Codifying the minimum standards of the law of international watercourses: remarks on 
part one and a half, 21(2) NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 99, 116 (1997). 
58 The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art. 1(1). 
59 Attila Tanzi, The U.N. Convention on International Watercourses as a Framework for the avoidance and 
Settlement of Water law Dispute, 11 LJIL 441, 446 (1998). 
60 Id. See also the UN Watercourses Convention; supra note 13, Art. 1 (2). 
61 Id. UN Watercourses Convention cited above, Art. 2(a). 
62 Id. Art. 2(b). Here it is important to note that the convention used the term ‘international watercourses’ than 
‘international rivers’ where the former as the former includes lakes and groundwater, in addition to rivers. 
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not include trans-boundary aquifers (confined groundwater) that do not contribute water to, or 
receive water from, surface waters.63 But, some argued that it is not entirely clear where 
exactly to draw the line between confined and non-confined ground waters and thereby 
identify those within the scope of the Convention from the uncovered once.64 This may be due 
to the “scientific uncertainty” on the issue.  
The exclusion of confined trans-boundary ground water, however, is pointed out as one of 
the most serious failings of the Convention65 even if states are expected to be guided by the 
principles of the Convention as revealed in the ILC’s recommendation and the draft article on 
trans-boundary Aquifers.66 There were also states which failed to sign the Convention due to 
this fact. On the other hand, the inclusion of non-confined groundwater in the Convention was 
also cited as a reason for the abstentions of certain states to vote in favor of the Convention.67 
Therefore, one can observe limitations with respect to the nature and scope of the Convention.  
IV. THE CONTROVERSIAL PROVISIONS OF THE CONVENTION 
The UN Watercourses Convention is a general framework agreement that contains thirty-
seven articles,68 which are divided into seven parts. In addition to those introductory 
provisions dealing about the scope of its application, the main areas that the Convention 
addresses include watercourses agreements;69 general principles like equitable and reasonable 
utilization70 and the obligation not to cause harm; 71 notification for planned measures;72 
protection, preservation and management;73 and dispute settlement.74 With a view to provide a 
background for subsequent discussions, this section focused on those controversial articles 
dealing with the relationships of the Convention to existing agreements, the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm rule and the relation thereof, and 
finally the notification procedures. 
A) The Status of Existing Agreements 
The relationship of the Convention to agreements concerning specific watercourses is dealt 
with in Articles 3 and 4 of the Convention with respect to existing agreements, future 
agreements relating to the entire watercourse and partial water agreements.75 The Convention 
generally encourages states sharing watercourses to enter into agreements that apply and 
adjust the provisions of the Convention to the particular characteristics of the watercourse 
                                                          
63  Stephan C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission adopts draft Article on Trans-boundary 
Aquifers, 103 AMER. J. INT’L L. 272, 283-284 (2009). See also Salman, supra note 1, at 8. 
64 Christian Bahrman and Raya M. Stephan, The UN Watercourses Convention and the Draft Article on 
Trans-boundary Aquifers: the way a head, UNESCO-UNEP Conference, Paris, 6-8 December 2010, 
International Conference ‘Trans-boundary Aquifers: Challenges and New Direction’ (ISARM, 2010) at 4. 
65 Tanzi, supra note 59, at 451. 
66 McCaffrey S., supra note 63, at 281-282. 
67 STEPHAN C. MCCAFFREY, The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls, in INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: ENHANCING COOPERATION AND 
MANAGING CONFLICTS 17, 18 (1997) 
68 In addition to the main 37 articles, the Convention annexed fourteen articles on Arbitration.    
69 The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art 3 & 4. 
70 Id. Art. 5 & 6.  
71 Id. Art. 7  
72 Id. Art. 11-19.  
73 Id. Art. 20-26. 
74 Id. Art. 33.  
75 Id. see generally Art 3 & 4. 
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concerned.76 Given the framework nature of the Convention, encouraging parties to enter in to 
specific watercourse agreements seems logical and expected. But the way that Art 3 of the 
Convention dealt with the status of existing agreements is particularly controversial.  
Unlike other provisions of the Convention, the debate and the positions of states on the 
validity or otherwise of existing agreements was not conditioned by the geographical 
considerations (upper riparian vis-à-vis lower riparian) but, rather by the question of who was 
well served by the existing agreements.77Some participants in the Working Group (notably 
Portugal and Ethiopia)argued that at least some provisions of the new Convention should be 
regarded as rules of ‘jus cogens’,78 and thus pleaded for the lapse of all existing watercourse 
agreements that contradicts with such rules.79 Particularly, Ethiopia wanted Article 3 to 
require existing watercourse agreements be harmonized with the Convention.80 In contrast, 
other states (Egypt, France and Switzerland) insisted that existing watercourse agreements 
should be left unaffected by the new Convention.81 Eventually, the text of Article 3 was 
revised by the Working Group and put to a vote before being adopted by 36 votes for, with 3 
against (Egypt, France, and Turkey) and 21 abstentions.82 
The provision preserves the validity of existing watercourse agreements, but adds that 
Parties “may, where necessary, consider harmonizing such agreements with the basic 
principles of the Convention.”83 From this provision one can understand that the Convention 
neither invalidated the existing agreements nor mandatorily required parties to harmonize it 
with the basic principles of the Convention. Moreover, the above compromise is virtually 
without substance because firstly, from the language used in Article 3(2), it is clear that there 
will be no “harmonization”, or amendment of existing agreements without the consent of all 
States Parties to them. Secondly, the ‘basic principles’ with which such agreements may be 
harmonized are not defined under the Convention. Therefore, the issue of harmonization as 
well as determining how and with which principles the existing agreements shall be 
harmonized is totally left to the states concerned, and can only be accomplished by agreement. 
That is why Caflish noted that “Article 3(2) does not go beyond stating the obvious, namely, 
that existing agreements may be amended with the consent of all the States Parties to them.”84 
As a result, riparian states that already have agreements in place like Egypt and Sudan, 
believe that the Convention has not fully recognized those agreements because it suggests that 
the parties may consider harmonizing such agreements with the principles of the Convention. 
On the other hand, riparian states that have been left out of existing agreements like Ethiopia 
believe that the Convention should have subjected those agreements to the provisions of the 
Convention, and should have required inclusion of all riparians in the said agreement.85 
                                                          
76 Id. Art. 3 (3). 
77 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 10. 
78 See VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1969), Art. 64.  
79 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 10. 
80 Verbatim record, 99th plenary meeting, UN GA, 21 May 1997, UN Doc. A/51/PV.99, 9-10, cited in: 
MCCAFFREY, Supra note 67, at 18. 
81 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 10. 
82 Id. 
83 The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art. 3(1) & (2). 
84 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 10.  
85 Salman, supra note 1, at 12.  
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Regarding the reason why the Convention opt not to require mandatory harmonization, 
McCaffrey raised the issue of its impracticability stating that “given the vast number and 
variety of existing agreements, such a requirement would have been impractical.”86 But, he 
further states that the absence of such requirements in the Convention does not mean that the 
principles reflected in the Convention will be without significance in the ‘interpretation’ of 
existing agreements.87 However, the writer of this article believes that even if the requirement 
of such harmonization would be difficult in practice and in return reduce its acceptance, it is 
not impossible. Rather it is a must as far as uniform and rule-based international regime is 
required to be established for the fair use and administration of trans-boundary water 
resources. Otherwise a party having a hegemonic status in the basin with respect to the 
‘material power’, ‘bargaining power’ and ‘ideational power’ will always be the winner by 
using the same as an instrument to influence and prevent weaker co-riparian from developing 
hydraulic works in their own territory; which is not fair.  
B) The Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization and the “No 
Significant harm” Rule 
The second and the most controversial provisions of the Convention are Articles 5 and 7, 
dealing respectively with the principle of equitable utilization and the obligation not to cause 
significant harm.88 Art 5 sets out the fundamental rights and duties of states concerning the 
utilization of international watercourses by providing for the equitable and reasonable 
utilization of the watercourse by riparian states. This obligation is to be pursued with a view to 
attaining optimal and sustainable utilization ‘consistent with adequate protection of the 
watercourse’.89 
According to this principle, a state must use an international watercourse in a manner that 
is equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis other states sharing the watercourse. But this balance of 
equitability can be achieved through cooperation and information sharing among riparian 
states.90 To this effect, the Convention provides the general obligation to cooperate91 and 
required riparian states to exchange data and information concerning the condition of the 
watercourse on a regular basis.92 That is why paragraph two of article 5 clearly provides a 
duty for participation between riparian states when using an international river. Therefore, the 
article includes both the right to utilize and the duty to cooperate.  
The Convention also provides non-exhaustive lists of factors that should be taken in to 
consideration in determining the equitability and reasonableness of water utilization among 
riparian states.93 Although, as will be discussed latter, the practical applications of the factors 
under Art 6 and attaching weight thereto are often difficult, those factors are needed to be 
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87 Id. 
88 Tanzi, supra note 59, at 453-454. 
89 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art 5(1). 
90 MCCAFFREY, supra note 67, at 19. 
91 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art 8. 
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93 Id. Art. 6(1). 
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weighed and balanced in every concrete situation without giving priority to any such factors 
over the others.94 
On the other hand, Art 7 provides the obligation of riparian states not to cause significant 
harm under two paragraphs. While the first paragraph incorporates the ‘no-harm rule’95, the 
second paragraph implies that a reasonable use may still cause significant harm to another 
watercourse state although all appropriate measures had been taken.96 The provision on the no 
harm rule was actually the most controversial one from the very first (1991) ILC draft version 
of the article;97 to the 1994 version98, and which still continued in the final version of the 
Convention. It was discussed very controversially in the Working Group seeking the 
amendment of the draft article.99 In this regard, the question whether the adjective ‘significant’ 
and the obligation of due diligence in the first paragraph (of the 1994 draft article) should be 
deleted; the issue of the introduction of another obligation of ‘all appropriate measures’ in the 
article’s second paragraph; and the question as to which of the two articles 5 and 7 should be 
superior if they come into conflict were among the most contentious points during the 
negotiations which in deed entails modifications. In contrast, the issue of compensation was 
hardly discussed and not changed by the Working Group.100 
Above all, the issue whether equitable utilization should prevail over the ‘no-harm’ 
obligation or vice-versa was the most controversial and hotly debated one.101 In this regard, 
upstream riparian states favor the equitable utilization principle because it gives them greater 
flexibility in developing new upstream uses, particularly where the watercourses are being 
used intensely in downstream states. Downstream states, on the other hand, preferred the no 
harm rule of Art 7 because it affords greater protection to their established uses.102 For 
example, with respect to the 1994 ILC’s draft version of Article 7, the downstream countries 
as well as many ‘intermediary’ States supported, while the upstream countries including 
Ethiopia opposed it.103 
                                                          
94 Arcari, Maurizio, The draft articles on the law of international watercourses adopted by the International 
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95 The UN Watercourse Convention, supra note 13, Art 7(1). 
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watercourse in such a way as not to cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States.’ And many argued that 
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102 Christina M. Carroll, Past and Future Legal Framework of the Nile River Basin, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVT. 
REV. 269, 284. See also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, at 
307 (Oxford University Press) (2007).  
103 CAFLISH, supra note 17, at 14. 
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However, after a lengthy debate by the Working Group, a compromise regarding the 
relationship between the two principles was reached where the new language of Article 7 
requires the state that causes significant harm to take measures to eliminate or mitigate such 
harm, and where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation, “having due regard to 
articles 5 and 6.”104 Regarding the voting pattern in the working group, the ‘package deal’ 
(represented by Articles 5 to 7) was accepted by 38 votes to 4 (China, France, Tanzania, 
Turkey), with 22 abstentions.105 Even if the compromise language facilitated approval of the 
Convention, some upper riparians still consider the Convention as biased in favor of lower 
riparians because of its specific and separate mention of the obligation not to cause harm. On 
the other hand, a number of downstream states such as Egypt concerned that the Convention 
favors upstream riparians because it subordinates the no harm rule to the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilization106.Although some argue that such controversies are the results of 
misconception107, the relationships between the two principles are said to be unclear under the 
Convention making the inherent tension to continue among the upstream and downstream 
riparians.108 
Therefore, the writer believe that it is better either to adopt the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle alone or limiting the application of the no harm principle to environmental 
damaging activities rather than water allocation issues while providing effective compliance 
mechanisms, financial or otherwise, that could deter parties as well as non-parties to refrain 
from non-compliance activities. In this regard, it is possible to take lessons from different 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) that restrict or ban trade with non-parties 
unless upon their de facto compliance with the requirements of the agreements.109  To this 
effect, for example the Watercourses Convection may use trade restrictive measures on 
products or services (e.g. agricultural products or hydroelectric power) produced using the 
watercourses in question for irrigation or hydroelectric generation although this proposal may 
face challenges from the GATT/WTO system that advocates free trade. Moreover, the 
proposal would be ineffective if the riparian state in question is determined to use the water 
resource only for domestic purposes.   
C) The Notification Procedures of the Convention 
The third controversial point is the notification process designed for planned measures under 
Part III of the Convention.110Under nine articles, the Convention provides a set of procedures 
to be followed in relation to new activity in one state that may have a significant adverse 
effect on other states sharing an international watercourse. This ‘obligation to provide prior 
                                                          
104 Salman, supra note 1, at 9. 
105 For more regarding the negotiations on Art 5&7, See generally Schroeder, supra note 19, at 39-47. 
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notification of such changes was accepted as a part of the Convention by most 
delegations.’111However, it is important to note that Ethiopia, Rwanda and Turkey voted 
against Part III of the Convention believing that the provisions gave veto power to 
downstream riparians.112 
Under the Convention, the planning state is required to give notice if the planned 
measures are predicted to have “significant adverse effect” up on the other watercourse states 
concerned. In other words, if the planned project is less likely to have a significant adverse 
effect on the other watercourse state, the planning state is not bound to give notice although 
there is still a room where the former state may request the latter to apply the normal 
notification procedures113.But it should be noted that determining whether the planning state 
has a duty to give notice or not may be debatable, because it depends on the question whether 
the planned activity has a significant adverse effect or not which is often subjective and 
depends on the manner that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) study has been 
conducted by the planning state. 
Unlike many ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements’,114 the UN Watercourses 
Convention does not expressly require the planning state to conduct EIA, albeit the issue is 
impliedly referred under Art 12. Moreover, the Convention neither provides the criteria and 
procedures for determining whether an activity is likely to have significant adverse 
environmental impacts nor leave the issue to be set by “joint commissions” where the 
contested states are guided up on.115Rather, the Convention left the issue totally to the 
concerned watercourse states where they may negotiate on the possible effects of planned 
measures on the conditions of an international watercourse116which ultimately required parties 
to determine whether the planned measures are consistent with the provision of Art 5 or/and 7, 
which is difficult to be agreed up on as will be discussed latter.117 
But in the situation where the planned measures may have adverse effect on the other 
watercourse state, the planning state shall give notice. In doing so, the notifying state is 
required to deliver the necessary data and information including the results of environmental 
impact assessment to the notified states118. Those states are then given six months to respond. 
But the six-month period put in place to reply for notifications may also be extended to 
another six months if the notified state faced ‘special difficulty’ in evaluating the planned 
measures. But during such period for reply, the notifying state shall not implement or permit 
the implementation of the planned measures without the consent of the notified States.119If the 
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Moreover, there is also EIA specific International Agreement viz. the ‘Convention on EIA in Trans-boundary 
Context’ (Espoo Convention, 1991). 
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notified states still object to the planned use, the concerned states shall enter into consultation 
‘with a view to arriving at an equitable resolution of the situation.’120Here again, the notifying 
State shall refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of the planned 
measures during the course of the consultations and negotiations, for a period of six months 
unless otherwise agreed121. Therefore, this entire process could take twelve months or longer. 
Due to such lengthy procedures, upper riparian states perceived that the notification 
process under the Convention favors downstream riparian and provides them with ‘a veto 
power’ over projects and programs of upstream riparian.122But many argued that the 
perception of upstream countries in this regard is inaccurate which is based on a false notion 
that “only upstream riparian can cause harm to downstream riparian”.123Actually, no veto 
power is provided for in Part III of the Convention. However, it should be noted that the said 
provisions have at least a temporary suspensive effect upon the implementation of measures 
by the planning state.124  
With respect to the above assertion, the writer of this article also believe that the 
Convention does not explicitly limit notification to downstream riparians or grant any state a 
veto power over the projects and programmes of other riparian states. Rather it requires 
notification of all riparians, both downstream as well as upstream.125 This means in the eyes of 
the Convention upstream states can also be ‘harmed’ by activities of downstream states. 
However, I believe that the kind of harm that could be caused by the activities of downstream 
riparians for which they are required to notify upstream riparians is largely limited to those 
impacts relating to ‘water quality changes’ (for example, those activities introducing 
evasive/alien species to the watercourses, be it plant or fish varieties, whose environmental 
impacts can spread even upward towards the jurisdiction of upstream riparians); rather than 
‘water quantity changes’. This is actually true in most basins where water infrastructures have 
already been developed by downstream riparians without giving any notification to upstream 
riparians like what happened in the Nile basin.  On the other hand, it is obvious that the 
downstream riparians can be harmed by the physical impacts of both the water quality and 
quantity changes caused by upstream uses since the water is flowing down. Thus, from this 
perspective the notification provisions of the Convention are more disadvantageous for 
upstream riparians and their impacts may go beyond delaying upstream projects although they 
do not go to the extent of giving a ‘veto power’ to downstream riparians.  
Nevertheless, some argued that the upstream riparians can be harmed by the potential 
foreclosure of their future use of water caused by the prior use and the claiming of rights by 
downstream riparians, so that the formers can also benefit out of the notification 
procedures.126However, this seems an abstract notion since the upstream riparians, in the 
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majority of instances, are already harmed by the existing water constructions and prior uses of 
downstream riparians, which cannot be rectified by the notification procedures of the 
Convention, unless such downstream uses are forced to be reduced proportionally. But the 
option of reducing downstream existing uses for the equitable utilization of the water by 
upstream riparians seems unlikely to occur in practice. Therefore, I believe that except the 
environmental or water quality change related harms, the above instances of harm caused by 
downstream states under ‘the concept of foreclosure of future uses’ seems uncovered under 
the notification procedures of the Convention. Because the Convention requires notification in 
case a ‘project may have significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States’. This 
means, the notification procedures of the Convention can apply either by downstream or 
upstream states when there are new project developments. Thus, except the case of new 
project development downstream, the notification provisions of the Convention are less likely 
to be invoked against downstream states that often tried to retrieve the status quo- their 
existing uses- rather than developing new projects.   
V. THE UNWCC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NILE BASIN: DOES IT REALLY MATTERS? 
It is important to note that the main principles laid down in the Convention, especially 
those concerning equitable utilization, prevention of significant harm and prior notification of 
planned measures are basically codification of customary international law.127 Moreover, the 
Convention has had a remarkable record of influence since its conclusion in 1997 as reflected 
in different judicial decisions and treaty negotiations.128Therefore, given its sphere of 
influence and customary international law status, the main principles of the Convention may 
be regarded as binding on all states whether they are parties or not.129In this regard, since the 
Nile basin countries including Ethiopia cannot escape from the application of the 
Convention’s principles by being out of it, one may argue that it would be better to join the 
Convention which has been endorsed by a number of international entities and financial 
institutions like the World Bank.130 
However, the fact that certain principles of the Convention are the codification versions 
of customary international water law does not necessarily mean that staying out from the 
Convention makes no difference. In other words, the effects of being party to the Convention 
for a given state may not be similar with the effects of the applications of the Convention in 
the name of customary international water law. This is because first, the problem is not mainly 
about the acceptability or otherwise of the Convention’s Principles, but the problem is the way 
those Principles are interpreted and applied on the ground by riparian states. The principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization for instance may have different meanings for Ethiopia and 
Egypt even if both agreed on the equitable utilization of the Nile water as a principle which in 
turn makes its practical application difficult.131 
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As will be discussed later, the problematic application of the Convention’s Principles 
mainly emanates from its compromising texts which paved the way for the existence of 
different types of interpretations by downstream and upstream countries. Second, the writer 
believes that all of the provisions of the Convention are not also the reflection of customary 
international water law. Even if the ILC mainly drafted the Convention based on the 
collections of customary international law, the ILC’s work was not linear where different 
approaches were tested and some were rejected with a view to compromise different 
interests.132 
Moreover, to determine whether the Convention really matters in Nile basin, it is 
important to examine its role in enhancing future cooperation in the region. Actually, the Nile 
states could theoretically consider negotiating a regional agreement under the auspices of the 
Convention since the Convention provides for the negotiation and adoption of regional 
watercourse agreements133 and establishes a general obligation to “cooperate on the basis of 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal 
utilization and adequate protection of international watercourses.”134 However, there are 
several barriers to using the Convention as a basis for a Nile agreement.135As mentioned 
earlier, most significantly, not all Nile states have supported the Convention during its 
adoption. Only Kenya and Sudan voted to adopt the Convention in the U.N. General 
Assembly. And more importantly none of the Nile riparian countries currently signed or 
ratified the Convention since its adoption.136 
Thus, given the non-party status of the Nile states and their divergent views with respect 
to the fundamental provisions of the Convention; particularly regarding the status of existing 
agreements and the relationships between the two principles (i.e. equitable and reasonable 
principle, and no significant harm principle) coupled with the Convention’s compromising 
and confusing languages thereto, it seems less likely for Nile river basin states to reach into 
consensus and come up with all-inclusive regional agreement under the framework of the 
Convention.137 Even, if they stand to use the Convention as the basis for their agreement, 
under the current conditions they either failed to reach into agreement or as mentioned earlier, 
the hegemonies-Egypt and Sudan- would take the advantages of the uncertainty that often 
emanates from the compromised languages of the Convention since the other weak co-riparian 
cannot fairly compete and able to enforce their line of argument on equal footing. 
Prior to the negotiation of a Nile agreement under the auspices of the Convention, the 
writer therefore believes that the Nile states first must come to a common understanding of the 
hydro- geography of the Nile and develop comparable institutional and legal frameworks for 
handling water resource matters on equal footing. Unless Nile states lay this foundation, a new 
Nile agreement will fail because of genuine and perceived inequities among riparian states and 
lack of capability to enforce the agreement. If countries do not have a shared view of the 
problems afflicting the Nile or the capability to implement management measures, they will 
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not be able to reach agreement or comply with the agreement that they create.138Hence the 
time for laying such foundations for genuine cooperation seems a long time dream in the Nile 
basin. 
This has been tested in practice during the negotiation process on the Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) which incorporates the provisions of the 
Convention on equitable and reasonable utilization,139 the obligation not to cause significant 
harm,140 as well as on cooperation141 and exchange of data and information,142but rejected by 
the two downstream countries- Egypt and Sudan - claiming the protection for current uses and 
rights143 in the name of “water security”.144Here it is important to note that, had they accept 
the equitable and reasonable utilization principle as stipulated in the CFA, they would not 
come up with the concept of ‘water security’ to ruin the applicability of the principle, which 
still benefit them more.  
However, as mentioned earlier the negative positions of the two downstream states do not 
often emanate from the fact that the provisions of the Convention are not, at least on average, 
downstream favored in the context of Nile. Rather their position is largely stemmed from the 
strong desire to make the status quo untouched. Therefore, in the situation where the two 
downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, still hangs on “historic rights” coupled with the 
problematic practical application of the Convention’s principles, it is difficult to argue that the 
existing Watercourses Convention would in fact matters in bringing the Nile basin countries in 
to genuine cooperative framework and thereby play a major part in the resolution of water 
allocation in the basin.145 
Although the question ‘so what should be done to envisage a new legal framework and 
governance scheme for the Nile’ is beyond the scope of this article, the writer believes that for 
effective future negotiations what matter is whether all relevant stakeholders are provided 
with the facilities to participate fully and effectively in the compacting of a new governance 
scheme for the Nile. In the first place the colonially-imposed Nile River Agreements must be 
set aside since they did not take into consideration the interests of most of the upper riparian 
states. However, while rejecting the colonially-imposed Nile River Agreements, it is equally 
important to note that any attempts to negotiate an agreement without the participation of 
Egypt will be ineffective, leading only to increased conflict. In this regard, it is important to 
note that had the CFA entered in to force with the only ratifications of the upper riparian states 
while excluding Egypt and Sudan, it could not bring sustainable solution.   
Therefore, trying to resolve the problem under a coordinated and all-inclusive multilateral 
approach shall always be considered as the first and the only option. However, it is important 
to change the negotiation fora with respect to the stakeholders to be participated in any future 
negotiations. Accordingly, I urge any Nile negotiation, whether it takes the UNWCC as the 
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basis or not, must include all the Nile River Basin riparian states where the national 
representations include not just each country’s elites (i.e., political and economic leaders) but 
also the local communities whose livelihoods are dependent on and intertwined with the Nile. 
Moreover, it should include the developed industrial countries (which have a substantial 
economic presence in the Basin) as well as the multilateral organizations that support 
development efforts in this region. In doing so a sustainable governance scheme for the Nile 
must fully and effectively define the rights and obligations of the various stakeholders, 
making certain that those who partake in and benefit from the exploitation of the river’s varied 
forms of wealth also contribute fully to its upkeep.146  
VI. IS JOINING TO OR STAYING OUT FROM THE UNWCC WOULD BE A BETTER POLICY 
ADVICE IN THE ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT? 
Given the divergent views and interpretations of the Convention’s provisions, the position 
of riparian states to join it or not would ultimately depends upon the lens they used to observe 
the provisions of the Convention vis-à-vis the positions of other competing riparian states. As 
mentioned earlier, the geographical position where along a watershed a riparian state is 
situated (i.e. as upstream or downstream riparian), the existence or otherwise of genuine 
cooperative framework, the amount of trust and confidence among riparian, and the overall 
characteristics of the basin may determine the position of a given riparian state “to join to or 
abstain from” the UN Watercourses Convention. 
Therefore, the question whether we are better off as non-party to the Convention or not 
should be examined based on the impacts that the Convention may impose on the interest of 
Ethiopia in the context of the Blue Nile in particular and the problems of the application of the 
Convention to the existing legal framework of the Nile basin in general. However, this does 
not mean that the issue shall be examined only in the context of the Blue Nile (Abbay) since 
most of the other major river basins of Ethiopia are also trans-boundary in nature.147However, 
among the trans-boundary rivers Ethiopia shares with other riparian states, the Blue Nile is the 
most important and poses many allocation challenges148at least due to two reasons; 1) it 
generates the lion share of the trans-boundary run-off from Ethiopia contributing 86% the Nile 
flow; and 2) it has been the long-lasting source of tension particularly with the two 
downstream states-Egypt and Sudan. For this reason, the article preferred to examine the issue 
largely from the context of Blue Nile and the two downstream riparian states since the other 
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river basins do not generate significant trans-boundary run-off and are not yet the sources of 
controversy.  
The status of existing agreements, the relationship between the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilization, and no significant harm, and the notification of planned measures are 
among the main issues of controversies and the unfinished business in the Nile basin.149 
Accordingly, pros and cons of joining the watercourses Convention in the context of Ethiopia 
would be assessed under different scenarios by taking in to consider the gaps of the 
Convention and the practical problems of applying the Convention’s principles. 
A. Failure to Demand the Establishment of Joint Commission to Enforce the 
Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization 
Although the Convention obligates parties to cooperate for various purposes,150it does not 
provide any guidance on how countries should do so151 and the enforcement mechanisms 
thereof. Particularly, it does not require the establishment of joint watercourse institution for 
the purpose of performing various functions, including: determining equitable allocations; 
managing international watercourses; settling disputes.152 Rather it simply provides that 
parties ‘may’ use joint mechanisms or commissions for the purpose of facilitating cooperation, 
managing the shared resource and settling disputes153 without requiring their establishment. 
From this we can understand that the Convention is weak in demanding collective actions.  
Especially, the establishment of joint Commissions would have a great role to effectively 
implement the cornerstone principle of the Convention and thereby adaptively manage an 
international watercourse with changing conditions.154 In the absence of genuine cooperative 
framework, quantitative water allocations and flexible treaty regime, the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilization would be an abstract notion with no or little implementation.155 To 
provide such imperatives for the effective implementation of the principle, joint institutions 
should be established with the authority to respond to changing conditions.156Although, the 
Convention provides obligations of regular exchange of date and information157 and prior 
notification of planned measures158 as a mechanism to keep the equitability balance in the uses 
of the water by one riparian state vis-à-vis the other riparian states, this system does not 
necessarily work well without a joint mechanism.159 
The Convention provides non-exhaustive lists of factors that should be taken in to 
consideration in ensuring the equitable utilization of the international watercourse.160As it will 
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be discussed later, however, it may be difficult for riparian states to reach agreement on what 
combination of factors constitutes equitable utilization, which are often subject to different 
interpretations. In order to settle such potential disputes, requiring the establishment of joint 
Commission mandated to provide guiding rules and procedures on which riparian states are 
bound to observe is necessary for the effective implementation of the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle. Despite this need, however the Convention simply required watercourse 
states to ‘enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation’ in applying Art 5 and 6, when the 
need arise.161 
In this regard, the CFA for example required Nile Basin States to ‘observe the rules and 
procedures established by the Nile River Basin Commission for the effective implementation 
of equitable and reasonable utilization’162, even if the Commission is not yet established due 
to the failure of the agreement to enter into force. The writer believes that the two downstream 
Countries-Egypt and Sudan- already known that, even before the commencement of the 
negotiations, they will not compromise on the so called ‘current uses and rights’ argument. 
They pretend as if they accepted the equitable and reasonable principle and make the 
negotiations to continue just to buy time as part of the “discursive hegemony” and “stalling 
tactics”.163That is why they intentionally postponed the establishment of the Nile River Basin 
Commission and made the same conditional up on the adoption of the CFA; because they 
know that they will never be party to the Agreement. 
Therefore, in the situation where the Watercourses Convention do not require the 
establishment of joint commission to facilitate cooperation and laying a foundation for the 
effective implementation of the cardinal principle of the Convention, the negotiations among 
riparian states would ultimately be a zero sum game where only the powerful is determined to 
win. Moreover, given the non-mandatory natures of the dispute settlement methods, except the 
“fact finding Commission”, the riparian states’ attempt to settle the issue of “equitable 
utilization” via the dispute settlement procedures of the Convention164 will be cumbersome.  
This is especially true in the Nile basin where there have been “much more discordance, 
unilateralism, mutual insecurity and suspicion rather than trust and cooperation.”165Although 
the problem of having an effective dispute settlement mechanism is common to all MEAs, it is 
better to take lesson from the WTO Dispute Settlement System (DSS) where the decisions of 
the panel and the appellate body are binding with mandatory and exclusive jurisdiction.166 
So given the fact that the application of the principle of equitable utilization is heavily 
reposes on the amount of confidence among riparians,167 the Ethiopia’s move to join the 
Convention will not add anything in the status quo and able to change the long lasting 
positions of Egypt and Sudan on the Nile River as revealed in the CFA negotiations. 
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B. The Paradox Between the Two Basic Principles of the Convention  
The interplay between the two principles-the equitable and reasonable principle and the no 
harm rule- and their application in disputes between the conflicting uses of riparian States is 
the central tenet of the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. It is, 
therefore, inevitable that these two principles and their scope and content have been, and 
remain, the subject of impassioned debate between riparian states as they attempt to apportion 
the waters of international watercourses.168 In the following sub sections, the limitations of the 
Convention in relation with the two principles and the difficulty to implement them will be 
discussed in the context of Nile River while determining whether joining or staying out is a 
better position for Ethiopia. 
1. The lack of clarity as to the relationships between the principle of equitable 
and reasonable utilization and the rule of “no significant harm” 
Before discussing the two cardinal principles of the UN Watercourses, it is important to 
highlight the two extreme doctrines – the “doctrine of absolute sovereignty” and the “doctrine 
of territorial integrity”- which have been claimed regularly by riparians in negotiations often 
depending on where along a watershed they are situated.169The doctrine of absolute 
sovereignty is often claimed by an upstream riparian arguing that a State has absolute rights to 
water flowing through its territory. This doctrine allows upstream states a complete freedom 
of action with regard to that segment of international watercourses irrespective of any 
prejudice it might entail in other downstream countries. Conversely, the doctrine of absolute 
integrity maintains that the upstream state may not do anything that might affect the natural 
flow of the water in to downstream state.170 Up on this doctrine, the lower riparian states have 
been attempted to secure their “historic rights” as acquired through seniority of use.171As 
Takele noted ‘[t]he positions of Nile riparian have also been, at least in theory, locked in these 
irreconcilable doctrines’172 
But since such doctrines are not acceptable in the contemporary international water law 
and leaves very little room for negotiations, the doctrine of equitable utilization has 
“originated as a middle position of reasonableness between the two extremes of the absolute 
territorial sovereignty assertions of upstream states and absolute territorial integrity claims of 
downstream states.”173With a view to reconcile the two extreme doctrines, the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilization has been incorporated as a cardinal principle in the UN 
Watercourses Convention, but not alone.174 Rather, it has been incorporated along with 
another concept- “the obligation not to cause significant harm”175, while without setting a 
clear priority between the two.176 This combination of Principles without a clear line of 
demarcation makes the implementation of the two Principles to be inherently in tension and 
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thereby allow the inherent doctrinal conflicts between upstream and downstream riparian to 
continue. As a result, the Convention failed to establish meaningful rules for states in conflict 
over water resources.177To this connection, Wolf noted that, 
Although the UN Convention has important components towards fostering peaceful 
relations, it is somewhat vague and even contradictory in its guidelines for the 
process of allocating international water resources. The document advises 
‘reasonable and equitable’ use, and offers a series of considerations, which ought to 
be taken into account. But it also institutionalizes an inherent conflict between the 
‘rights based’ positions of the upstream riparian-the principle of equitable use, 
sometimes argued in lieu of absolute sovereignty - and the downstream riparian - the 
obligation not to cause significant harm, a refined protection of historic rights.178 
Similarly, Utton while commenting the compromising languages of the draft article of Art 5 
and 7, observed a direct clash between the established doctrine of equitable utilization and the 
rule of no significant harm.179The attempt to accommodate the two doctrines having different 
origins (as the doctrine of equitable utilization is for allocation of water quantity whereas the 
no significant harm is for the protection of water quality) would make the concept of 
reasonableness and the equitable consideration of all factors to be lost.180 That is why it has 
been argued that the Convention created the collusion between the rules of water quantity and 
water quality. With a view to reconcile the two principles and thereby demarcate their areas of 
application, Utton proposed the rearrangement of the ‘no harm’ rule provision in the way to be 
applied in relation to water quality rather than quantity issue. Thus, the equitable and 
reasonable principle would clearly apply in water allocation disputes181 unless the equitable 
utilization created water quality problem in which case the use that cause significant 
pollution/harm shall be deemed unreasonable.182 
When we put the trigger in to the Nile basin, there is nowhere that the Watercourses 
Convention’s “limitations are more apparent than in the geopolitical asperity of the Nile River 
Basin”.183 As one of the Convention’s limitation, the lack of clarity as to the relationship 
between the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and no significant harm 
hindered the Nile basin countries to reach in to agreement. And it was one of the major issues 
that proved highly contentious during the whole process of CFA negotiations. 
This is because, Egypt and Sudan do not merely assert their rights under the colonial and 
post-colonial treaties (the 1929 and 1959 agreements); they reinforce those rights by invoking 
the principle of no significant harm’s prohibition on adverse impacts to their allocations. On 
the other hand, upstream states including Ethiopia are increasingly assertive of their rights to 
an equitable and reasonable utilization of the Nile River’s water resources. Unable to resolve 
the inherent tensions between the two principles, the states have resorted to creating an 
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entirely new legal principle-water security.184 But the definition of water security is disputed 
and leaves the Nile River Basin without a cooperative management agreement.185 
Therefore, given the competition between the two cardinal principles and the absence of 
clear supremacy of the equitable and reasonable principle in the Convention, the move to join 
the Convention would be more disadvantageous for Ethiopia than the two downstream states-
Egypt and Sudan. This is because in the context of the Nile basin, where the water is already 
fully used by Egypt and Sudan, Ethiopia’s new use would almost inevitably result in the 
reduction of the quantity of the water that flows downstream and thereby bring ‘significant 
harm’ on downstream states even if its use is ‘reasonable’ and ‘equitable’.186 
In summary, due to the Convention’s limitation, the riparian states do not agree as to the 
instances where the no harm rule could apply with respect to the principle of equitable 
utilization. Ethiopia believes that a Nile water allocation should be based on the principle of 
equitable utilization, and that the no harm principle should only operate when a state has 
exceeded its equitable or reasonable use.  Egypt, on the other hand, believes that each country 
has the right to the uninterrupted flow of the river through its territory; any measure that 
changes the status quo flow is causing significant harm.187Thus, as mentioned earlier the 
application of the equitable utilization and no harm principles will pit upstream and 
downstream states against each other. And this would be advantageous for the most 
downstream country Egypt where it can use its ideational and bargaining power to influence 
the process of negotiations. 
2. The Principle of Equitable and Reasonable Utilization: the difficulty to 
determine “equitable utilization” 
In addition to the lack of clarity as to the interplay between the two cardinal Principles, the 
equitable and reasonable utilization principle by itself is a vague one with many possible 
interpretations. Vague and relative terms of the Convention like ‘equitable’, ‘reasonable’, 
‘optimal’, and ‘sustainable’ are difficult to determine. Defining such concepts are intentionally 
vague both for reasons of legal interpretation and for political expediency which are creating 
ambiguity in the application of the principle.188 
It is agreed that the practical application of an equitable and reasonable apportionment of 
an international watercourse requires the examination of all the relevant conditions of the 
watercourse and its riparian States.189To this effect, Art 6 of the Convention lays out a non-
exhaustive list of factors that are relevant to determine what is equitable and reasonable in the 
course of utilizing an international watercourse or when negotiating or entering in to an 
agreement on an international watercourse.190 However, there is no hierarchy among these 
                                                          
184 CFA, supra note 48, Art. 14. 
185 Stoa, supra note 108, at 1325. 
186 Takele, supra note 136, at 222. 
187 Carroll, supra note 102, at 290. 
188 Wolf, supra note 31, at 7. 
189 Helal, supra note 5, at 347. 
190 UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art. 6 (1). Although the factors are non- exhaustive, the said 
sub-article of the Convention listed out seven factors : (a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, 
ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse states 
concerned; (c) the population dependent on the watercourse in the watercourse state; (d) the effects of the use or 
uses of the watercourse in one watercourse state on other watercourse states; (e) existing and potential uses of the 
28 HARAMAYA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:1 
components of ‘reasonable use’. The applicable factors, which include the existing and 
potential uses of the watercourse, have no inherent weight. They are to be balanced according 
to their relative importance in a given situation where “all relevant factors are to be considered 
together and a conclusion reached on the basis of the whole”.191 In addition to the 
aforementioned article, Art 10 of the Convention says that, “in the absence of agreement or 
custom to the contrary, no use enjoys inherent priority over other uses”, and that “in the event 
of a conflict between uses, (it shall be resolved) with special regard being given to the 
requirements of vital human needs”.192 Thus, except ‘vital human needs’, no use 
(hydroelectric power, irrigation, navigation etc) enjoys priority over the other use.  
However, the application of those factors in determining the equitability or otherwise of 
the water use is difficult for different reasons. First, the Convention neither gave priority for 
certain factors nor attaches any weight to those factors. Thus, even if states may consider 
many factors under Art 6, it may be difficult to reach agreement on what combination of 
factors constitutes equal utilization. Second, Article 6 does not indicate whether states should 
consider the number of factors or the strength of the factors implicated.193 
Moreover, the scopes of certain factors are not clear and so that they are open to different 
interpretations.194 For example, the “social and economic needs of the Watercourse States”, as 
one relevant factor is not clear as to whether it connotes the degree of the economic 
dependence on the watercourse or the relative economic development of the watercourse state. 
However, many scholars argued that the factor should not be construed to imply the stage of 
economic development which can further be collaborated by the fact that a criteria referring to 
the stage of economic development of watercourse States in one of the reports was deleted in 
the final version of the Convention.195 Similarly in the “population dependent factor”196, 
whether the degree of dependence of the population or the size of the population or both 
should be the relevant factor in equitable and reasonable apportionment is not clear.197 
Moreover, regarding “availability of alternatives, of comparable value” factor, the text is not 
clear whether such alternatives should be water-based or not. However, the ILC noted that 
such alternatives need not be water-based. But the substitute options should be of generally 
comparable feasibility, practicability and cost-effectiveness.198But the term “Comparable 
value” is still ambiguous. The Convention does not specify how this term should be used.199So 
in the situation where clear definitions and scopes of the relevant factors have not been clearly 
stipulated in the Convention, the same factor can easily be formulated to support either side in 
the same debate.  
Therefore, it would be difficult for Nile riparian states to reach in to agreement as to what 
combination of factors constitutes equal utilization. Although disputes over the application of 
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Articles 5 and 6 are supposed to be answered under the Convention’s dispute settlement 
provisions, such a process could be cumbersome.200 Thus, given the ideational and bargaining 
power of Egypt, it is doubtful that Ethiopia will benefit from the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle whose application is often vague and subject to different interpretations.  
3. The relevant factors to determine equitable utilization: To whom they favored 
in the context of Nile? 
As mentioned earlier, under the Convention’s calculation of equitable utilization, it is complex 
to measure and quantify the weight that should be attached to a given individual factor and 
thereby reach in to genuine conclusions on the basis of the whole. Accordingly, Ethiopia and 
Egypt for example may have different views of what constitutes utilization in an “equitable 
and reasonable manner”. And they may arrive in to different conclusions while using the same 
factors as bases of their calculation. For instance the fact that both existing and potential uses 
are incorporated as determining factors with no priority201 allowed both Egypt and Ethiopia to 
make arguments in favor of them. However, as will be discussed, the totality of factors seems 
to give more protection to existing uses and thereby favored Egypt and Sudan than Ethiopia. 
Egypt, which uses the greatest amount of Nile water, may consider its utilization 
equitable because it has no other source of water. In fact, Egypt argued during the Working 
Group negotiations that availability of other water sources should be a factor for determining 
equitable utilization under Article 6 although its proposal was not accepted.202However, still 
the factor, “the availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned and 
existing use”203seems to favor Egypt. Since Egypt has no other source of water other than 
Nile, it can use this factor to consolidate the argument that it has no other projects available of 
‘comparable value’ than Ethiopia. Egypt also might consider its use equitable because it was 
the first to make use of the Nile waters. It could use the “existing or potential use” factor204 to 
support that argument. Here, even if Ethiopia can also use this factor on the basis of “potential 
use”, the weight of this factor may be offset by Art 6(1) (d)’s factor which consider “the 
effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one Watercourse State on other watercourse 
States”. This is because Egypt and Sudan already have developments on Nile River so that 
any new developments by Ethiopia will affect their existing uses. And it is usually the 
upstream state that cause harm to the downstream although as some argued the downstream 
riparian can also cause harm to upstream by foreclosing the future uses of the upstream.205In 
this regard, Ethiopia could argue under Article 6(d) that ‘the effects’ of Egypt’s ‘use’ on the 
amount of water that Ethiopia may use is inequitable. But compared to Egypt, Ethiopia’s 
argument on this factor will not make a significant change on the total weight. In addition, 
Egypt might argue that “the population dependent on the watercourse” factor weighs in favor 
of protecting uses that its population has been dependent on over time.206 Finally, it may argue 
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that it is using water equitably because it has advanced systems for “conservation” and 
“economy of use” given its technological advancement.207 
The second Article 6 factor, “the social and economic needs of the watercourse states 
concerned,” seems favorable to Ethiopia and other Nile states that have a lower per capita 
income than Egypt.208But as discussed above, many argued that this factor is dealing about the 
economic dependence on the watercourse rather than the stage of economic development of 
the watercourse state.209 And this cast doubt as to whether the factor indeed favors Ethiopia. 
Above all, the Convention does not list out certain factors under Art 6 as relevant factors that 
could rather add value for Ethiopia. For instance, the contribution of water from each 
watercourse state, and the extent and proportion of the drainage area in the territory of each 
watercourse state are not listed as relevant factors for determining equitable utilization under 
Article 6 of the Convention. Had such factors been expressly listed in the Convention, they 
could be construed in favor of Ethiopia since it contributed 86% of the Nile water and has 
large basin area next to Sudan.  
Actually, the lists of factors are illustrative so that riparian states may agree to add other 
relevant factor depending up on the unique features of the basin.210 But, this does not mean 
that there is no difference between the listed and non-listed factors. Because, once the factor is 
listed, it would be relevant for determining equitable utilization unless it is totally irrelevant in 
the basin. In the contrary, however riparian states need to agree to add additional factors other 
than those listed under Art 6 of the Convention. 
At the Working Group level, India sought to include “the contribution of water from each 
watercourse state” as a factor in the Convention, but the Working Group declined to include 
it.211Ethiopia, however, could argue that its significant contribution must be considered as a 
‘relevant’ ‘hydrographic’ or ‘hydrological’ factor.212 But, the exclusion of the aforementioned 
factor by the Working Group affects the weight it could rather have in determining equitable 
utilization. And obviously Egypt and Sudan may use the rejection of this factor by the 
Working Group to amplify the irrelevancy of the above factor in determining equitable 
utilization and thereby consolidate their argument while exploiting the benefits derived from 
other factors. Thus, the exclusion of such determinant factors puts Ethiopia in a 
disadvantageous position. 
Nevertheless, one may argue that it is because of the inclusion of “hydrological factors” 
that the issue of “water contribution” was finally left out. However, the writer of this article 
disagrees with this assertion on the belief that “the water contribution” factor should be 
included as an independent factor given the large place it ought to have among other 
“hydrological factors”. The Helsinki Rules, for instance, (which is said to be the basis of the 
Watercourses Convention) explicitly referred to the ‘water contribution factor’ by saying: 
“[T]he hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin 
                                                          
207 Id. Art. 6(1) (f). 
208 Id. Art. 6(1)(b). 
209 Helal, supra note 5, at 350. 
210 For instance, the two factors have been added to CFA text. See CFA, supra note 48, Art 4(2)(h) and (i).  
211 Helal, supra note 5, at 349. 
212 The UN Watercourses Convention, supra note 13, Art 6(1)(a). 
2015]                         UN WATERCOURSES CONVENTION FROM ETHIOPIAN CONTEXT                             31 
 
 
State;”213 showing the large place the water contribution factor should have within the 
‘hydrological factors’ category.  Thus, the inclusion of the ‘hydrological factor’ cannot justify 
the failure to recognize the ‘water contribution’ factor as an independent factor unless the 
exclusion is aimed to get the voice of the downstream riparian states and leaving the issue a 
point of contention. 
In summary beside the difficulty to apply the principle of equitable and reasonable 
utilization, the majority of the equitability determining factors seems inclined to favor Egypt 
and Sudan than Ethiopia.  
4. The application of the ‘No harm rule’ 
Besides the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization of international watercourses, the 
obligation not to cause significant harm to other watercourse States is the second fundamental 
pillar of the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. However, like that of 
equitable and reasonable principle, the no harm rule which provides that states ‘take all 
appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm’214 is also difficult to apply. 
First, the Convention defines neither the term ‘harm’ nor ‘significant harm’. Second, if 
‘harm’ is caused, Article 7(2) provides that a watercourse state ‘take all appropriate measures’ 
to eliminate or mitigate the harm. But, it will be hard to determine what action is adequate to 
satisfy the duty of ‘all appropriate measures’. In addition, a watercourse state may pay 
compensation ‘where appropriate’ if it has caused significant harm to another watercourse 
state. Again, there will be disagreement about when compensation is ‘appropriate’. That is 
why McCaffrey described the final result of negotiations of Art 7 as a “basket of Halloween 
candy: there is something in it for everyone. No matter whether you are from the equitable 
utilization or the no-harm school, you can claim at least partial victory.”215 
The Convention does not provide adequate guidance, for example as to whether the use of 
more water by Ethiopia constitutes harm to Egypt? Or does ‘harm’ only refer to serious 
pollution of the waters that would in turn affect a downstream state? Although the Convention 
does not absolutely prohibit causing significant harm,216 the ‘equitable and reasonable 
utilization’ of the Nile water by Ethiopia still may cause significant harm to Egypt and Sudan. 
Thus, in the situation where harm is inevitable to downstream existing uses by new 
developments of Ethiopia, Egypt may demand compensation under Art 7(2) even if Ethiopia’s 
utilization is equitable and reasonable. If this is so, it would be unfair for Ethiopia to join the 
Convention.   
C. The Way the Convention Dealt with Existing Agreements 
The existing Nile legal framework is uncertain for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the 
colonial and post-colonial era agreements are either invalid or their validity is in question. 
Egypt and Sudan insists on their validity, whereas other Nile states, following either the clean 
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state or Nyerere concepts of state succession, have denounced them.217Although some argued 
that colonial agreements as well as post-colonial bilateral agreements between Egypt and 
Sudan over the Nile have no legal effect whatsoever,218 they continue to hinder fresh 
negotiations and agreements up on the equitable utilization of the Nile.219As observed during 
the negotiations on CFA, Egypt and Sudan maintain that the framework should include a 
clause that reads: “[n]ot adversely affect the water security of current uses and rights of any 
other Nile Basin states.”220 The water security of current uses and rights referred to here is the 
uses established under the 1929 and 1959 treaties between Egypt and Sudan.221 
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier the UNWCC neither invalidates the existing 
agreements nor required their harmonization with its basic principles. In other words, parties 
are simply encouraged, but not obligated, to harmonize existing agreements with the basic 
principles of the Convention.222And this may affect the interest of Ethiopia.  
Since the two Nile agreements (i.e. the 1929 and 1959) are bilateral in their nature, 
Ethiopia may argue that they bind only the parties to them- Egypt and Sudan. Thus, if 
Ethiopia became party to the Convention (along with Egypt and Sudan), its rights under the 
Convention may not be affected in this regard, because Ethiopia was not party to such 
agreements.223Moreover, unlike the White Nile riparian countries, Ethiopia has never been 
under colonization except the temporary occupation by Italy. Thus, the argument of Egypt and 
Sudan regarding the validity of 1929 agreement on the basis of “state succession” would not 
work in the Ethiopian context. 
However, it is important to examine whether Egypt and Sudan may take advantage over 
Ethiopia regarding the 1902 and 1993 agreements since Ethiopia signed those agreements as 
an independent sovereign state with colonial Britain and Egypt respectively. Actually, 
Ethiopia cannot raise ‘the clean state’ doctrine to renounce their validity. But particularly, 
with respect to the 1902 treaty, it seems that Ethiopia has a legitimate defense. Article III of 
the Treaty stipulated: “not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue 
Nile, Lake Tana, or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters except in agreement 
with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of Sudan”.224Based on this 
treaty, Sudan insists that Ethiopia may not begin Nile water projects without the consent of 
Britain and Sudan. Ethiopia, however renounced this agreement, inter alia invoking the 
Egyptian and Sudanese practice of denouncing unequal treaties signed by Britain on their 
behalf if they no longer reflect their development needs.225 
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Moreover, Ethiopia has renounced this agreement on the view that the Emperor signed 
the Treaty as the result of a mistranslation between the English and the Amharic version of the 
Treaty which is considered as ‘error of fact’.226According to the Amharic version, ‘arrest’ had 
been translated into ‘stop’, that is, as long as Menilk did not stop the waters, the agreement did 
not prevent him from utilizing and diverting Blue Nile water which seems playing with 
words.227And such error of “a fact or situation” may also render the Treaty void, as per Article 
48 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which mostly codified customary 
treaty rules. 
However, whatever rebutting arguments may be, it seems that Egypt may take advantage 
of the 1993 Framework agreement for General Cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia as far 
as the UNWCC does not affect existing agreements. Article 5 of the agreement states: “Each 
party shall refrain from engaging in any activity related to the Nile waters that may cause 
appreciable harm to the interests of the other party.”228 As we can understand from the 
provision, it incorporates only the ‘no harm rule’. There is no mention of equitable and 
reasonable utilization. Therefore, in the situation where the relationships between the two 
principles are controversial under the Convention, Egypt may use the 1993 agreement to argue 
that Ethiopia has accepted the primacy of no harm rule over the equitable and reasonable 
utilization principle. 
However, here the question may arise as to whether the 1993 framework agreement for 
general cooperation between Egypt and Ethiopia is a treaty with a binding effect or not. Of 
course, it is clear that as the status of the agreement differs, so does the influence and the 
effect it renders. The fundamental principle of treaty law is undoubtedly the proposition that 
treaties are binding upon the parties to them and must be performed in good faith (i.e. pacta 
sunt servanda) irrespective of whatever name the agreement is captioned. Otherwise, there is 
no reason for countries to enter into such obligations with each other.229 As stipulated under 
Art 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty is defined as: ‘an international 
agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, 
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever 
its particular designation.’ However, this does not mean that every agreement in written form 
is a treaty and binding on the parties thereto. It is essential that the parties intend to create 
legal relations as between themselves by means of their agreement. Thus, it is the ‘intention 
not to create a binding arrangement’ governed by international law which marks the difference 
between treaties and informal international instruments. In this regard, memoranda of 
understanding and exchange of notes for example are not as such legally binding.230 
 Here, it is important to note that the 1993 agreement is neither a memoranda of 
understanding nor exchange of note. Rather, it is the agreement entered between heads of 
state/government of the two countries having ‘full powers’ for the purpose of concluding the 
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treaty in accordance with Art 7 of the Vienna Convention. However, it may still raise a 
question as to whether it is just a declaration of intension or a binding treaty. At this juncture, 
while illustrating the need to make a difference between a treaty and other non-binding 
international agreements, the well-known international law scholar Malcom Shaw noted:      
“…many agreements between states are merely statements of commonly held 
principles or objectives and are not intended to establish binding obligations. For 
instance, a declaration by a number of states in support of a particular political aim 
may in many cases be without legal (though not political) significance, as the states 
may regard it as a policy matter and not as setting up juridical relations between 
themselves. To see whether a particular agreement is intended to create legal 
relations, all the facts of the situation have to be examined carefully.”231 
Given the framework nature of the 1993 agreement laying a background for future 
negotiations, one may argue that the agreement is too early to be called a treaty and result in a 
binding effect on parties. This, however, further requires the examination of the intent of the 
parties as seen in the language and context of the document concerned, the circumstances of 
its conclusion and the explanations given by the parties.232 The texts of the agreement mainly 
focused on identifying the focus areas of cooperation for future negotiations which are 
actually broad in scope including other areas of cooperation in addition to the issue of Nile. 
However, the writer of this article believes that Art 5 of the agreement is the core and the most 
important provision of the agreement that reflects the intension of the parties to be bound by 
the wordings of the provision. The wording of the provision that clearly innumerate the 
commitment to which the parties are consented coupled with the focus of Art 6 on future 
consultation and cooperation of ‘projects that would enhance the volume of flow and reduce 
the loss of Nile waters’ shows how the agreement is concluded by Egypt only for the sake of 
Art 5 with a view to make it binding in future negotiations. 
Thus, I believe that the 1993 agreement is a treaty but having a nature of framework 
agreement which calls for further negotiations and specific agreements on the use of the Nile 
waters. Nevertheless, future agreements could not be reached by the two states; they cannot 
deviate from the general objective of the Agreement and its provision of Art 5 that provides 
specific commitment particularly on Ethiopia. Moreover, even if the agreement was not 
ratified by Ethiopia, the act of signature of an international agreement, such as the 1993 
agreement, by a member state creates an international obligation of good faith to refrain from 
acts designed to frustrate the objectives of the agreement.233 Moreover, even if the 1993 
Agreement may be regarded as a mere declaration of intention and thereby is not legally 
binding, it may have still a legal consequence as the circumstances of the case, for example as 
an aid to the interpretation of some other treaty - may be the UNWCC. As confirmed from 
other cases, there are even instances where the memorandum of understanding were not 
declared by tribunals as legally irrelevant (as the circumstances of the case) although they are 
not source of independent legal rights.234 
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D. The Notification Procedures of the Convention 
The notification requirement of the Convention for planned measures actually applies for both 
upstream and downstream riparians. However, the detailed notification provisions of the 
Convention, as mentioned earlier, seem disadvantageous for upstream countries like Ethiopia. 
This is because in most river basins including Nile, major hydraulic works have already been 
developed unilaterally and without consultation by downstream riparian. And the attention of 
those riparians inevitably turned to protecting the flow of water on which these facilities 
depended.235Therefore, the detailed notification provisions of the Convention may at least 
delay the developmental activities of Ethiopia. 
The issue was also a point of controversy during CFA negotiations where the two 
downstream countries – Egypt and Sudan-proposed detailed provisions in terms of exchange 
of information concerning planned measures similar to what was provided in the UN 
Watercourses Convention.  But having such detailed procedures on notification procedures 
would have been tantamount to giving veto power to the downstream countries; the proposal 
was opposed by Ethiopia.236 And finally parties agreed such information exchange and 
notification of measures to be made through the Nile basin Commission once it is established 
under the CFA.237 
VII. ADVANTAGES AND BENEFICIAL APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION 
In contrast to the difficulties with the practical application of Articles 5, 6, and 7, and 
other related gaps of the Convention, the environmental management section of the 
Convention would be useful if it were applied to the Nile region. Part IV of the 1997 
Convention is generally dedicated to “Protection, Preservation and Management” of 
international watercourses.238For example, Article 21, which obligates watercourse states to 
consult with each other for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution, suggests that 
states set joint water quality objectives and criteria, devise techniques and practices to address 
pollution from point and non-point sources, and establish lists of substances that may not be 
added to the watercourse. Accordingly, Nile states could agree to utilize these factors in the 
development of a Nile water quality agreement. 
Generally, the articles relating to the protection of the ecosystems of international 
watercourses provide “an important starting point, and reflect minimum international 
standards below which states may not fall, indicating the basis upon which states can further 
their efforts to achieve cooperative arrangements with their neighbors in the use of shared 
freshwater resources.”239 
In addition to the mutual benefits that could be derived from the green provisions of the 
Convention, being party to the Convention may increase the bargaining power of Ethiopia in 
the Nile basin. Since the Convention is endorsed and acknowledged by donor countries and 
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financial institutions240, joining the Convention may pave the way to get financial assistance 
or loan so that it can construct mega projects with in short period of time. This would be true 
however if the hydro hegemonies - Sudan and Egypt- remained as non-party states. But from 
the overall assessment, the disadvantages of joining the Convention overweight than its 
benefits in the context of Ethiopia. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The article examines the provisions of the UN Watercourse Convention in the Ethiopian 
context and determines whether joining to or staying out is a better off advice. To this effect 
the provisions are analyzed by taking in to consider the existing legal frameworks and 
positions of the two downstream countries- Egypt and Sudan. 
The article reveals the difficulty to apply the Convention’s provisions and how they 
favored downstream countries- Egypt and Sudan. First, the relationship between the equitable 
and reasonable utilization principle and “no harm rule” is not clear. Moreover, the practical 
applications of the two principles are difficult and subject to different interpretations. 
Although the Convention listed out non-exhaustive factors to determine equitable utilization, 
the task of weighting those factors is difficult. Due to the lack of clarity of certain factors, the 
same factor can also be construed to support both sides in the same debate. Similarly, the 
practical applications of the no harm rule would be difficult. Terms like ‘significant harm’ and 
‘appropriate measures’ are vague and open for interpretations. In such conditions, if Ethiopia 
joins the Convention, it would be at disadvantageous position where it may be forced to pay 
unnecessary bills for the advantages of the two downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan. 
Despite the difficulty to apply the equitable and reasonable utilization principle, many of 
the individual factors used to determine equitability seems to favor Egypt. The detailed 
notification procedures and the way the Convention deal with the status of existing 
agreements cumulatively affect the interest of Ethiopia. Although Ethiopia and other Nile 
basin states would benefit from the environmental protection provisions of the Convention, 
the disadvantage of joining weighted in the context of Ethiopia. Thus, given the gaps of the 
Convention coupled with Egypt’s adherence to historic right based argument, it is better for 
Ethiopia to stay out from the Convention and its complexities while expecting at least ‘a half 
and a loaf’ from the application of the customary international water law regime. But it should 
be noted that the application of customary international water law regime is not still free from 
controversies. Nevertheless, Ethiopia would definitely get a better half from the complexities 
of customary international law rather than the complexities of the Convention where parties 
are at least required in principle to adhere to the wordings and texts of the Convention; which 
often contains confusing and downstream favored provisions. 
 
                     
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